1. Introduction {#sec1-sensors-19-02625}
===============

With the proliferation of mobile devices such as smartphone, the use of smart sensors has increased, convergence and connectivity between devices have been secured, and interest in the Internet of Things (IoT) environment has rapidly increased throughout the IT convergence field. ICBM (IoT, Cloud, Big Data, and Mobile), which is currently the most important issue in the IT industry, is attracting attention as the next-generation growth engine. Application of the IoT to reality from an Internet-based convergence center is expected to increase efficiency and convenience and diversify economic values. However, to achieve such a positive outcome in the future, it is necessary to solve various risk factors implied by the IoT. For example, to connect various devices, compatibility problems between devices should be solved. Furthermore, to provide personalized services, the compatibility of mobile devices with intensive personal information will inevitably become necessary \[[@B1-sensors-19-02625]\].

The largest share of the mobile platform market is occupied by Google Android. The number of IoT devices that are compatible with Android is projected to reach over 25 billion by 2021 according to Gartner \[[@B2-sensors-19-02625]\]. In this hyper-connected service environment, mobile devices are vulnerable to security threats that can infect all connected IoT devices. This means that we live in an era where the security of mobile platforms is of the utmost importance. Android, as a typical open mobile platform, has been experiencing various security problems due to the `Dalvik`-based self-signing application structure \[[@B3-sensors-19-02625]\]. Android applications implemented in the `Java` language and distributed as Android application package (`APK`) files can be easily restored as `smali` code or original `Java` source code using reversing tools such as `apktool` \[[@B4-sensors-19-02625]\] or `dex2jar` \[[@B5-sensors-19-02625]\]. The code of the disassembled (or decompiled) application is easily exposed to attackers. As an attacker can analyze the code, the core application code can be bypassed or modified, which can cause serious issues for the application developer. Furthermore, malicious code can be inserted into the application, which is then redeployed as a benign application, thereby extending such issues and damage to general users \[[@B6-sensors-19-02625],[@B7-sensors-19-02625]\].

Several protection techniques have been explored in a variety of areas, such as application code obfuscation \[[@B8-sensors-19-02625]\], API hiding \[[@B9-sensors-19-02625]\], tamper detection \[[@B10-sensors-19-02625],[@B11-sensors-19-02625]\], and packing \[[@B12-sensors-19-02625],[@B13-sensors-19-02625]\] to protect applications from these malicious behaviors. However, as described above, these protection techniques and tools \[[@B14-sensors-19-02625],[@B15-sensors-19-02625],[@B16-sensors-19-02625]\] are not safe from attackers owing to the structural characteristics of Android, in which it is relatively easy to analyze the code \[[@B17-sensors-19-02625],[@B18-sensors-19-02625],[@B19-sensors-19-02625],[@B20-sensors-19-02625],[@B21-sensors-19-02625]\]. Therefore, researchers are reinforcing the complement through continuous improvement of vulnerability, and attackers continue to analyze and utilize these technologies.

In terms of runtime systems, Android Runtime (`ART`), a new runtime system for Android \[[@B22-sensors-19-02625]\], has emerged and completely replaced `Dalvik VM` in Android 5.0. `ART` runs applications through direct machine code, unlike the existing `Dalvik VM`-based runtime system, which does so by running the application's `Dalvik` bytecode through the interpreter. There are several improvements in `ART` compared with the existing `Dalvik VM`, including improved performance of the application's machine code without the need for an interpreter. However, the reversing vulnerability due to code exposure in the existing `Dalvik VM` has not been clearly solved, and the present reverse engineering analysis technique can still be applied to the newly introduced `ART` \[[@B23-sensors-19-02625],[@B24-sensors-19-02625],[@B25-sensors-19-02625],[@B26-sensors-19-02625],[@B27-sensors-19-02625]\].

Essentially, this is because existing `Dalvik` Executable (`DEX`) files coexist in the Optimized Ahead-of-Time (`OAT`) file \[[@B28-sensors-19-02625]\], which is the `ART` executable file, and these `DEX` and compiled machine codes have *one-to-one mapping* relationships. For this reason, if it can be artificially manipulated to call the `DEX` file inside the `OAT`, the vulnerability of the existing `Dalvik VM` can be exploited as-is in `ART`. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a scheme to overcome this vulnerability by eliminating the one-to-one mapping relationship between bytecode and machine code and exposing the disguised bytecode to confuse analysts.

This paper is organized as follows. [Section 2](#sec2-sensors-19-02625){ref-type="sec"} is an analysis of `ART`, the latest Android runtime system. [Section 3](#sec3-sensors-19-02625){ref-type="sec"} presents a newly discovered security vulnerability based on the `ART` structural characteristics. [Section 4](#sec4-sensors-19-02625){ref-type="sec"} introduces the proposed scheme to solve the security vulnerability. [Section 5](#sec5-sensors-19-02625){ref-type="sec"} describes experiments with the implementation of the proposed scheme. [Section 6](#sec6-sensors-19-02625){ref-type="sec"} discusses the issues considered in the proposed scheme. [Section 7](#sec7-sensors-19-02625){ref-type="sec"} concludes the paper.

2. Background {#sec2-sensors-19-02625}
=============

`ART` was first introduced to Android 4.4 (KitKat). Since Android 5.0 (Lollipop), the `Dalvik VM` has been completely replaced by `ART` as the default runtime system \[[@B29-sensors-19-02625]\]. In this section, we examine differences between `Dalvik` and `ART` from the viewpoints of file and execution structure.

2.1. Differences between `Dalvik VM` and `ART` {#sec2dot1-sensors-19-02625}
----------------------------------------------

### 2.1.1. Installation and Execution {#sec2dot1dot1-sensors-19-02625}

Android applications are implemented in `Java` with high productivity and portability. The Android execution environment also has an execution structure very similar to `Java`. The only difference is that, for Android, the `DEX` file is distributed, which is the result of compiling the `Java` bytecode (intermediate language) with `Dalvik` bytecode using the `dx` tool. This distributed Android application runs on the Android device that contains the `Dalvik VM`.

`Dalvik VM` and `ART` differ largely in how they install and run applications internally. For the `Dalvik VM`, the `dexopt` tool creates an Optimized `DEX` (`ODEX`) file for the `DEX` file in the deployed `APK` at the time of application installation. The `ODEX` file is the actual executable file in the `Dalvik VM` environment and is almost the same as the original `DEX` file. However, some of the opcodes are optimized for the execution environment, or the file with Inline expansion is applied. On the other hand, in the case of `ART`, the `DEX` file is compiled through the `dex2oat` tool into a completely new form called an `OAT` file. The `OAT` file is the result of `ART`'s Ahead-Of-Time (`AOT`) compilation \[[@B30-sensors-19-02625]\] and is a substantial executable file in `ART` that replaces the `ODEX` file.

The two runtime systems that create their own executable files, `ODEX` and `OAT`, at the time of application installation also differ in their application execution. The `Dalvik VM` runs applications based on their `Dalvik` bytecode. At present, Just-In-Time (`JIT`) compilation \[[@B31-sensors-19-02625]\] is used, which contrasts with the `AOT` compilation of `ART`. On the other hand, `ART` basically executes the application based on its machine code and, in some cases, by alternating the two code areas through an execution conversion structure between `Dalvik` bytecode and machine code.

### 2.1.2. Compilation {#sec2dot1dot2-sensors-19-02625}

Both `JIT` compilation and `AOT` compilation improve the execution performance of the application by generating its bytecode as machine code, but the time at which the machine code is generated differs. `JIT` compilation, which has been applied from Android 2.2 Froyo, generates machine code at the time of application execution. On the other hand, `AOT` compilation, applied with the introduction of `ART`, generates machine code at the time of application installation. Compared to `JIT` compilation, the `AOT` compilation at the time of installation improves execution performance. Compared with the existing `Dalvik VM`-based Android, `ART`-based Android has increased application installation time, and the capacity of the `OAT` file is also increased compared with the `ODEX` file in `Dalvik VM`.

2.2. Runtime Environment Transition {#sec2dot2-sensors-19-02625}
-----------------------------------

### 2.2.1. `OAT` File Structure {#sec2dot2dot1-sensors-19-02625}

The `OAT` file is created through the `dex2oat` tool and follows the `ELF` file format, as shown on the left of [Figure 1](#sensors-19-02625-f001){ref-type="fig"}. This `OAT` file is an executable file in `ART` that consists of an `oatdata` section in the `ELF` file and an `oatexec` section. More specifically, there is a compiled machine code in the `oatexec` section of the `OAT` file. The `oatdata` section consists of `OatHeader`, `OatDexFile`, `OatClass`, etc. and also contains various information such as classes and methods to execute the application. There is a `DEX` file in this `oatdata` section for creating an `ODEX` file in an existing `Dalvik VM`. That is, the `classes.dex` file contained in the conventional `APK` (without special protection techniques such as changing the `APK` structure to prevent reversing) is still present. The inclusion of the `DEX` file in the `OAT` file creation process is closely related to the internal operation mechanism of `ART` to prepare for cases where the original machine code does not exist, such as an abstract method.

### 2.2.2. Method Execution and Entry Point Management {#sec2dot2dot2-sensors-19-02625}

Most methods in `ART` have a machine code compiled in the `oatexec` section in the `OAT` file, whereas `Dalvik` bytecode exists in the `DEX` file in the `oatdata` section of the `OAT` file. Most `ART` methods are based on compiled machine code, but certain methods operate through the interpreter as in existing `Dalvik VM`-s. For example, if the method is an abstract method, the machine code corresponding to the method does not exist, or if the runtime system is set to interpreter mode, it is executed as `Dalvik` bytecode instead of as its own machine code. In the case of abstract methods, the body of the method is defined in the child class, and so the machine code for the abstract method itself does not exist. Thus, abstract methods are always executed through the interpreter area.

Whether a method exists in machine code and whether the runtime system is in interpreter mode is determined by the `NeedsInterpreter()` function. If the machine code of the method does not exist, the entry point of the method is set such that the method is executed through `Dalvik` bytecode. Even if the machine code exists, the method is set to the interpreter mode based on the information of `current_runtime_instance`, and the execute method proceeds as `Dalvik` bytecode as described above.

The execution transition mechanism caused by the mixture of machine code and `Dalvik` bytecode is performed by each method rather than by the application unit. Even if only a single application is run, the application methods will have their own execution flow. At the time the application is loaded for the method execution flow, the `ArtMethod` class sets the entry points for each method and changes the entry points during application execution. The `ArtMethod` class not only manages information such as method indexes and access flags, but also manages the entry point information of a method as a struct. Each entry points to one of several candidates are represented in [Figure 2](#sensors-19-02625-f002){ref-type="fig"}. For example, an `Entry_Point_from_Interpreter` points to either `Interpreter_To_Interpreter_Bridge` or `Interpreter_To_Compiled_Code_Bridge`.

The entry points of the method determine the entry point when called from each execution area, as the name suggests. The execution region is divided into an interpreter execution region for executing `Dalvik` bytecode and an execution region for executing the compiled machine code. For example, assuming that `Method A` calls `Method B`, if `Method A` is executed in the machine code execution area, the entry point of `Method B` would be `Entry_Point_from_Quick_Compiled_Code`, and if `Method A` is executed through the interpreter area, the entry point of `Method B` would be `Entry_Point_from_Interpreter`. Thus, in an environment where `Dalvik` bytecode and machine code executions are mixed, methods have multiple entry points. The actual execution switching is accomplished through the trampoline and bridge techniques described below.

### 2.2.3. Bridge and Trampoline {#sec2dot2dot3-sensors-19-02625}

The bridge is used to switch between the `Dalvik` bytecode execution region and the machine code execution region. The trampoline is used to find the address of the actual method to be called in order to support the dynamic loading and binding mechanism. [Figure 3](#sensors-19-02625-f003){ref-type="fig"} shows the overall execution switching structure through bridge and trampoline.

1.  `Interpreter_To_Interpreter_Bridge (I2I Bridge):
    ` This bridge is used to maintain the execution flow from the interpreter area to the interpreter area. After calling the callee method in the call stack frame, it checks whether the class to which the method belongs is initialized, and finally executes the method through the `Execute()` function in the interpreter area.

2.  `Interpreter_To_Compiled_Code_Bridge (I2C Bridge):
    ` This bridge is called when switching the execution flow from the interpreter area to the machine code area. In the case of `Interpreter_To_Interpreter_Bridge`, the callee method is searched from the call stack frame to check whether the class to which the method belongs is initialized. However, the actual method is executed through the `Invoke()` function, which is a member method of the `ArtMethod` class, not the `Execute()` function. The `Invoke()` function internally calls the `art_quick_invoke_stub()` function, which is written in assembly language, to execute the machine code of the method. In other words, the `Entry_Point_from_Quick_CompiledCode` of the method is checked again, the entry set point is entered, and finally the machine code of the method is executed.

3.  `Quick_To_Interpreter_Bridge (C2I Bridge):
    ` This bridge is used when a transition from the compiled machine code execution region to the interpreter region is required. The bridge internally calls the `EnterInterpreterFromStub()` function, which causes the method to be executed in the interpreter area via the `Execute()` function, exactly like the final execution of `Interpreter_To_Interpreter_Bridge` described above.

3. Challenges to Reverse Engineering {#sec3-sensors-19-02625}
====================================

3.1. Dynamic Debugging Support {#sec3dot1-sensors-19-02625}
------------------------------

In `ART`, the debugging mode uses Java Debug Wire Protocol (`JDWP`), similar to the one used in the existing `Dalvik VM` environment. In other words, in debugging mode, even though the compiled machine code of the target method exists, the `Dalvik` bytecode is executed through the interpreter area. Here, the target method indicates a method that has an event such as a break or watch when debugging. The debugging event is registered through the `ProcessDeoptimizationRequest()` function in the `Dbg` class and changes the entry point to the method of the executing application through the `UpdateEntrypoints()` function according to the request transmitted to the function.

Because of the use of the debugging mode to induce bytecode execution instead of the machine code in `OAT`, it is possible to apply the reverse engineering analysis technique that was originally operated in `Dalvik`. The following are a few best practices that allow an application to run in interpreter mode through a break event.

1.  `kFullDeoptimization/kFullUndeoptimization:
    ` When the `kFullDeoptimization` request is passed to the `ProcessDeoptimizationRequest()` function, bridges and trampolines are set at entry points of the method so that all methods of the application operate in the interpreter domain. Conversely, in the case of a `kFullUndeoptimization` request, method execution through the interpreter is disabled, and bridges and trampolines are set at entry points of the method to act as the method's original execution flow. As shown in [Figure 4](#sensors-19-02625-f004){ref-type="fig"}, the above request occurs when we break or release a breakpoint in a method's header.

2.  `kSelectiveDeoptimization/kSelectiveUndeoptimization:
    ``kSelectiveDeoptimization` is a request to execute only certain methods in the interpreter area. As shown in [Figure 5](#sensors-19-02625-f005){ref-type="fig"}, when a breakpoint is placed on or off a method body, the request is made and the entry points of the methods are set to the appropriate bridges and trampolines via the `UpdateEntryPoints()` function.

    Assume that there is a part in the body of `Method A` that calls `Method B`. It is important to note that `Method A` is executed in the interpreter area, and `Method B`, in the same step as step over or step into the part where `Method B` is called, is executed in the interpreter area. On the contrary, in case of resume, another entry point update is performed, and `Method B` is executed as machine code through `Interpreter_To_Compiled_Code_Bridge`. When the call to `Method B` in the body of `Method A` is finished, the remaining part of `Method A` is transferred to the interpreter area through `Quick_To_Interpreter_Bridge`.

3.2. Dynamic Analysis on Applications {#sec3dot2-sensors-19-02625}
-------------------------------------

As detailed by the analyses thus far, there is a class.dex file in the `APK` file, even in the `ART` environment, and static analysis can be performed on `ART` without new tools or analysis techniques. The `DEX` file of the application, which is the main target of static analysis, exists in the `OAT` file as well as in the `APK` file. These `OAT` files can be analyzed using the `oatdump` tool. [Figure 6](#sensors-19-02625-f006){ref-type="fig"} shows an `OAT` file analysis using `oatdump`. The `oatdump` tool returns the header information of the `OAT` file and all class and method information in the `OAT` file. In the case of a method, the `Dalvik` bytecode and its corresponding machine code are shown.

Next, it can be said that dynamic analysis completely matches the existing analysis technique. `ART` provides application dynamic debugging via `JDWP` similar to the `Dalvik VM`. Typical Android application dynamic analysis tools include `IDA` and `NetBeans`, which provide dynamic analysis through `JDWP`. In dynamic analysis, if you generate an event in the method you want to analyze, the `Dalvik` bytecode of the method is exposed as usual, and the contents of the method are easily analyzed (see [Figure 7](#sensors-19-02625-f007){ref-type="fig"}). Thus, despite the changes in runtime system, both static and dynamic reverse engineering are possible using the same tools and techniques. The root cause of this is the exposure of the `Dalvik` bytecode.

[Figure 8](#sensors-19-02625-f008){ref-type="fig"} compares an original `Java` source code with its generated `Dalvik` bytecode. The `Dalvik` bytecodes corresponding to each `Java` source code listed on the left are clear. In the case of the assignment operator, the type of variable and its contents are immediately accessible. In the case of string concatenation, procedures omitted at the time of development are indicated, and the amount of code is increased so that there is no difficulty in its interpretation. You can also acquire information on the type of arguments to be passed to the method, its contents, class information to which the method to be called belongs, and information on method prototypes. In addition, line information and variable names in the `Java` source code are exposed, and detailed method information can be obtained.

On the other hand, unlike `Dalvik` bytecode, machine code does not provide symbol information such as strings, class names, and method names used in an application, and thus it is difficult to analyze. Therefore, in the case of application analysis through machine code, the `Dalvik` bytecode should be analyzed based on the signatures of the codes generated when it is compiled into machine code.

The code in [Figure 9](#sensors-19-02625-f009){ref-type="fig"} is the code signature that calls the method. The `ldr r0, [r0, INDEX]` command represents the index for `ArtMethod` in `ArtMethodArray`. In this case, because the method that can be used as an index includes a preloaded method, it is not possible to analyze which method is called other than the information that the method is called only by the corresponding `OAT` file. That is, it is quite challenging to use signature-based application analysis to check for correct information such as which method is called, what string is binding, and so on. Therefore, to protect your application from reverse engineering, it is important to minimize the exposure of the `Dalvik` bytecode.

4. Proposed Scheme {#sec4-sensors-19-02625}
==================

In `ART`, an executable `OAT` file contains a mix of machine code and `Dalvik` bytecode, and the execution flow is separated for each method to check that the application is running. Therefore, we confirmed that the existing `Dalvik`-based reverse engineering analysis technique can be applied by switching the artificial execution flow to `Dalvik` bytecode. This paper proposes a scheme to protect the application by exposing the trap code which is arbitrary fake code to the bytecode part of the `OAT` file. Given the structural characteristics of the `ART`, the `Dalvik` bytecode has no choice but to be exposed.

4.1. Principal Idea {#sec4dot1-sensors-19-02625}
-------------------

As detailed in the above `ART` analysis, one method exists in the form of `Dalvik` bytecode and one exists in the form of machine code in the `ART` environment. Assume that `Method A`, shown inside the interpreter of [Figure 10](#sensors-19-02625-f010){ref-type="fig"}, is in the form of `Dalvik` bytecode, and `Method A’` is in the form of machine code. They differ in their forms, but the `Dalvik` bytecode is independent of the `DEX` file area (`oatdata`) of the `OAT` file, which is the actual executable file in `ART`, and machine code in the machine code area (`oatexec`) of the `OAT` file. Once the machine code is generated based on `Dalvik` bytecode, it is placed in an independent area, which reduces the inter-code dependency. Therefore, an attacker can easily perform reverse engineering analysis of a target application by using an existing bytecode analysis technique without analyzing the relatively difficult machine code. Thus, the basic idea of this proposed scheme is to hide the bytecode in the one-to-one mapping relationship between the bytecode and machine code in the current `OAT` file and to expose a bytecode that is not related to the actual machine code, as shown in [Figure 11](#sensors-19-02625-f011){ref-type="fig"}.

Use of the proposed scheme increases resistance to reverse engineering not only for static analysis but also for dynamic analysis. Dynamic debugging is accomplished through `JDWP`. This means that debugging using `JDWP` uses bytecode rather than machine code. If `Method A` in the form of `Dalvik` bytecode calls `Method B` ([Figure 12](#sensors-19-02625-f012){ref-type="fig"}), and the corresponding `Method B’` in the form of machine code is the same as `B`, then the contents of `Method B` can be analyzed through dynamic analysis. However, when the proposed scheme is applied to the two codes through `Dalvik` bytecode modulation, the results of `Method B’` through normal execution and of `Method B` through dynamic analysis are completely different, which can greatly increase the analysis difficulty. In the end, dynamic analysis, similar to static analysis, analyzes the trap code that behaves completely differently from the actual operation, which can delay the analysis time and even lead to analysis failure.

4.2. Design Concept {#sec4dot2-sensors-19-02625}
-------------------

The proposed scheme separates the core code part to be protected from the `DEX` file and generates the core code as a separate `OAT` file, which is called the *Core OAT* file, as shown in [Figure 13](#sensors-19-02625-f013){ref-type="fig"}. Next, to confuse the analyst, a `DEX` file is created that pretends to be bytecode corresponding to the machine code, which is called *Camo DEX (Camouflage DEX)* in this paper.

### 4.2.1. `Core OAT` Generation {#sec4dot2dot1-sensors-19-02625}

`Core OAT` is an `OAT` file that contains core code in the form of machine code. `Core OAT` compiles the core code existing in the original `DEX` file through `dex2oat`, then modifies the `oatdata` section where the `DEX` file exists as mentioned in [Section 4.1](#sec4dot1-sensors-19-02625){ref-type="sec"}; as a result, the bytecode existing in `Core OAT` has modulated bytecode instead of core code. In the proposed scheme, the bytecode corresponding to rooting detection modifies with the reversing monitoring bytecode, bytecode corresponding to the tamper detection modifies with the obfuscated fake code, and the core routine modifies with the trap code having no relation to the original code to confuse the analyst's reverse engineering process. This `Core OAT` file can either be included in the `APK` to be dynamically loaded from the local device or be distributed through a server as in \[[@B32-sensors-19-02625],[@B33-sensors-19-02625],[@B34-sensors-19-02625]\]. The choice of distribution method may vary depending on the execution environment and security policy.

### 4.2.2. `Camo DEX` Generation {#sec4dot2dot2-sensors-19-02625}

`Camo DEX` has the same package name, class, and method structure as the actual `Core OAT`; however, it is a file that is configured to perform a completely different operation from `Core OAT` at run time. The behavior can be simply an application that prints `“Hello World”`, or any Android application such as a calendar or file browser. `Camo DEX`, however, can be said to act as a trap because it appears to be executing the code corresponding to the core routine, which is the target of the dynamically loading.

`Camo Dex` plays a role not only in trapping but also in solving `Core OAT` compatibility issues. The original `OAT` file has various checksum values, as shown in [Table 1](#sensors-19-02625-t001){ref-type="table"}, based on various information from the generation process. Even if there is one identical `APK` file, the `OAT` file that has been compiled may have a different checksum due to slight differences depending on the environment of the installed device. The `Core OAT` distributed with the proposed scheme also has its own checksum values according to the environment at the time of generation, and problems arise when loading classes dynamically because of these values.

### 4.2.3. `Core OAT` Loading and Execution {#sec4dot2dot3-sensors-19-02625}

As shown in [Figure 14](#sensors-19-02625-f014){ref-type="fig"}, an application with the proposed scheme should be able to dynamically load a class that contains a separate `Core OAT` . It is assumed that the `Core OAT` file is included in the APK. The first target for dynamic loading is `Camo DEX`. Assuming the cache does not exist when the application first runs, `DexClassLoader` uses `dex2oat` to compile `Camo DEX` into `Camo OAT` and store it in the cache path specified in the second parameter of `DexClassLoader`. From the saved `Camo OAT`, extract the `ChecksumB` value corresponding to [Table 1](#sensors-19-02625-t001){ref-type="table"} and overwrite the `checksumA` in the `Core OAT` with `ChecksumB`. At this time, delete the `Camo OAT` in the cache path and replace it with `Core OAT` . Now, `Core OAT` along with `ChecksumB` will act as `Camo DEX`'s cache and the application will run normally.

5. Experimental Results {#sec5-sensors-19-02625}
=======================

To evaluate the proposed scheme, the experiment on reverse engineering resistance was carried out, comparing with the result of applying commercial obfuscation tools.

5.1. Experimental Setup {#sec5dot1-sensors-19-02625}
-----------------------

We first wrote a simple code, as shown in [Figure 15](#sensors-19-02625-f015){ref-type="fig"}, and then applied ProGuard \[[@B15-sensors-19-02625]\] and DexGuard \[[@B14-sensors-19-02625]\], which are commercial obfuscation tools, as well as the proposed scheme. The degree of difficulty was evaluated by applying existing reverse engineering techniques to APKs independently built. The versions of ProGuard and DexGuard used in this experiment were 4.7 and 7.0.31, respectively, and the obfuscation options were set to default values for each tool. Running the APK was done on Google Nexus 5 devices with Android 5.1 Lollipop MR1, Android 6.0 Marshmallow, and Android 7.0 Nougat. Note that the specification of DexClassLoader has changed since Android 8 (API level 26), so the proposed scheme works up to Android 7 which occupies more than 60% of the Android OS market share \[[@B35-sensors-19-02625]\].

5.2. Resistance to Reverse Engineering with `ProGuard` {#sec5dot2-sensors-19-02625}
------------------------------------------------------

Experiments were performed on resistance against reverse engineering attacks of obfuscated sample code through `ProGuard`, which is the most basic obfuscation solution. [Figure 16](#sensors-19-02625-f016){ref-type="fig"} shows that the string data value and the routine of the function are exposed as naive. As a result of analyzing the application using `ProGuard`, it can be seen that the output is the same except for the identifier name and debugging information of the original code. In addition, [Figure 17](#sensors-19-02625-f017){ref-type="fig"} is optimized for `ProGuard`; hence, the optimized code can be observed for easy analysis. This is why `ProGuard` is vulnerable to reverse engineering attacks.

5.3. Resistance to Reverse Engineering with `DexGuard` {#sec5dot3-sensors-19-02625}
------------------------------------------------------

Unlike `ProGuard`, `DexGuard` cannot obtain meaningful information only through straightforward disassembling using `classA->’` object and `classA->$(B,I,B)` function common to both `methodA()` and `methodB()`, as shown in [Figure 18](#sensors-19-02625-f018){ref-type="fig"}. The code in [Figure 19](#sensors-19-02625-f019){ref-type="fig"} also shows less optimization than `ProGuard`. However, it is a very simple routine, so there is not much applied to techniques that make analysis difficult.

[Figure 20](#sensors-19-02625-f020){ref-type="fig"} is a disassemble code of `classA->’` object and `classA->$(B,I,B)` functions. It can be observed that a `String` is created through a specific operation. The `String` generated from the \$ function is used as the input value of the `Log`, which is generated by [Figure 18](#sensors-19-02625-f018){ref-type="fig"}. Thus, reverse engineering for `DexGuard` can also be achieved without significant difference from `ProGuard`, even though there is a certain level of difficulty in finding decryption routines and decoding the hidden data or routines.

5.4. Resistance to Reverse Engineering with Proposed Scheme {#sec5dot4-sensors-19-02625}
-----------------------------------------------------------

This section compares and evaluates reverse engineering attack resistance and performance through static and dynamic analysis of an application with the actual proposed scheme.

[Figure 21](#sensors-19-02625-f021){ref-type="fig"} shows the `smali` code that extracted and disassembled the `Camo DEX` file from the application with the proposed scheme. `Method A` is a method that prints a string "`Here is methodA ()`" through the Android log method, then calls `Method B` and prints the returned strings by the result. `Method B` assigns the strings "`NORMAL`" and "`DEBUGGING`" to the `v0` and `v1` registers, respectively, and returns the `v1` register. Therefore, when you call `Method A`, you can expect \``RUN MODE: DEBUGGING`" to appear after the string "`Here is methodA ()`". However, as a result of actual execution, "`NORMAL`" is output instead of the string "`DEBUGGING`", as shown in [Figure 22](#sensors-19-02625-f022){ref-type="fig"}.

The above results show that the `Camo DEX` file is statically analyzed and the result is different from the expected result. There is no difference when you look at the contents of the `OAT` file that is actually executed. [Figure 23](#sensors-19-02625-f023){ref-type="fig"} shows the dump of the `OAT` file using the `oatdump` tool. In `Core OAT`, you can still see that `Method B` returns the string "`DEBUGGING`" and prints it in `Method A`.

Next, the result of executing `Method C` is shown in [Figure 24](#sensors-19-02625-f024){ref-type="fig"}. It can be observed that `Method C` returns 9999 through the execution result, but, in the result of dumping the `OAT` file, 2222 and 1111 are allocated internally in `Method C` and then their difference is returned. That is, according to `Dalvik` bytecode, the value that `Method C` should return is 1111, not 9999. However, the machine code can be used to understand the results of `Method C`. In the machine code, you can find the sum of 5555 and 4444.

Thus, we can see that method analysis becomes more difficult by modulating its contents between the `Dalvik` bytecode and native code so that they are not the same, as shown in [Figure 25](#sensors-19-02625-f025){ref-type="fig"}. Analysis of methods based on `Dalvik` bytecode, which is easy to analyze, yields incorrect analysis results, and then the method must be analyzed based only on the native code. Therefore, the contents of the original `Dalvik` bytecode are not exposed at the time of static analysis for the application where the proposed scheme is applied, and it is possible to greatly enhance the difficulty of static analysis because analysts must analyze machine code with a high analytical difficulty.

5.5. Difficulty and Overhead Comparison {#sec5dot5-sensors-19-02625}
---------------------------------------

As is the case in the existing `Dalvik` environment, it is possible to analyze the application with only the `Dalvik` bytecode reverse engineering techniques in the `ART` environment. In contrast, in the case of an application using the proposed scheme, various skills such as machine code reverse engineering and runtime system analysis technology are additionally required. Therefore, the proposed scheme increase the difficulty of reverse engineering attacks. Based on the evaluation of reverse engineering attack resistance, the ability required for analysts to analyze obfuscated applications compared to existing obfuscation tools is shown in [Table 2](#sensors-19-02625-t002){ref-type="table"}.

As the application is started, additional time and storage space are required to perform tasks related to the proposed scheme. As a result of experiments based on 17 KB `Core OAT` and 33 KB `Camo DEX`, the additional time required to execute the application was $17.793$ ms, as shown in [Table 3](#sensors-19-02625-t003){ref-type="table"}. The proposed scheme has a run-time overhead 1.7 times that of the original application. It is slower than `ProGuard`, but faster than `DexGuard`. In the case of `ProGuard`, a simple renaming technique is applied in the process of `APK` generation and optimization is performed. On the other hand, in `DexGuard`, the overhead is large because the decryption routine is executed each time the function is executed. The proposed scheme is expected to be suitable for practical use with less overhead than the commercial tool `DexGuard.`

In the end-user device environment, the storage capacity is the same size as the file stored in the application local directory. The simplest expression is `2xCamoDex+2xCoreOAT`, where the minimum capacity of `Camo DEX` is approximately 33 KB, the most basic `DEX` file size.

6. Discussion {#sec6-sensors-19-02625}
=============

6.1. `Core OAT` Dynamic Loading Requirement {#sec6dot1-sensors-19-02625}
-------------------------------------------

In this proposed scheme, the `Core OAT` file containing the core code is designed to be loaded dynamically. The reason for this dynamic loading is the root privilege issue and `OAT` file modification problem at the time of installation. The application is installed as an `OAT` file on the Android device. As shown in [Figure 26](#sensors-19-02625-f026){ref-type="fig"}, the generated `OAT` file is in the "`/data/dalvik-cache/[arch]/`" path. The partition requires a root privilege and cannot be accessed by end users or general applications. A permission problem occurs when attempting to apply the proposed scheme to the `OAT` file created after the installation process.

Therefore, if it is difficult to change the created `OAT` file, it is necessary to intervene in the `OAT` file creation to apply the required code splitting, which can be done by artificially modifying the Android platform. For this reason, the `OAT` file applied by the proposed scheme is designed to be recognized as a normal cache file corresponding to the `DEX` file through class dynamic loading.

6.2. Additional Trapping through `Core OAT` Modulation {#sec6dot2-sensors-19-02625}
------------------------------------------------------

`Core OAT` files require basic understanding of `OAT` file structure and `DEX` file structure to modulate the `OAT` file, and the degree of trap implementation may vary depending on the understanding of the `Dalvik` bytecode command. The object to be modulated is `Dalvik` bytecode, and `Dalvik` bytecode exists in the `DEX` file located in the `oatdata` section of the `OAT` file. The `code_item` entry in the `DEX` file contains the actual register information and the actual `Dalvik` bytecode used by the method. Generally, the modulation process can be divided into two types.

[Figure 27](#sensors-19-02625-f027){ref-type="fig"} shows that all `code_item` entries in the method have been replaced with zeroes. In this case, the register information and access information of the method are all 0, and all commands are shown as a `NOP` state. This method has the advantage of being able to completely block exposure of the original `Dalvik` bytecode from future reversing and is simple to implement. However, it has the disadvantage of being very noticeable.

To compensate, only a part of the `Dalvik` bytecode can be modulated. [Figure 28](#sensors-19-02625-f028){ref-type="fig"} shows altering the `opcode` of the instruction by modifying the "`add-int`" `Dalvik` bytecode command value `0x90` with the "`sub-int`" `Dalvik` bytecode command value `0x91`. Simply by increasing the value of the opcode by 1, the method's `Dalvik` bytecode becomes completely different from the machine code. In addition, operands can be further modified to provide more complexity here and can be replaced by completely different opcodes. This approach can intentionally expose the fake `Dalvik` bytecode to the analysts. It can confuse the analyst more effectively and force `Dalvik` bytecode and machine code to compare and contrast.

The above procedure allows for the setting of various traps by effectively modulating the original `Dalvik` bytecode with a primary trapping operation. The modified `Core OAT` can be deployed through the server or distributed within the `APK`, and later applications can use the original `Core OAT` through class dynamic loading on the Android device.

6.3. Core OAT Integrity Check {#sec6dot3-sensors-19-02625}
-----------------------------

In the proposed scheme, the `checksum` of `Core OAT` is changed to the `checksum` value of `Camo OAT`, and so integrity verification may become vulnerable. In this case, the `Core OAT` may be replaced by the malicious `OAT`, or the application protection routine on the `Core OAT` may be disabled by the analyst. Additional authentication mechanisms \[[@B36-sensors-19-02625],[@B37-sensors-19-02625],[@B38-sensors-19-02625]\] are needed to address these vulnerabilities. Applications could use only authenticated `OAT` files using a challenge-response method that allows the application and `Core OAT` to communicate with and authenticate each other rather than a simple file verification method. If the file is not an authenticated `OAT` file, the `Core OAT` should be reacquired.

6.4. Limitations {#sec6dot4-sensors-19-02625}
----------------

The proposed scheme interferes with the analysis by exposing the trapping code instead of the core routine. Furthermore, several machine code reversing skills are required to analyze the code generated by the proposed scheme. Unlike the existing solutions, which are easily reversible only with static analysis, the proposed scheme increases the analysis difficulty by requiring knowledge of `ART` structure and machine code analysis skills on Android architecture. However, if the attacker is able to analyze the machine code of the `Core OAT` based on an understanding of the machine code and with knowledge of the `ART` system structure, the proposed scheme also fails. Compared to other commercial obfuscation solutions, the proposed scheme can compensate for these limitations because it requires relatively low execution overhead. In addition, existing obfuscation tools must use a combination of several options that require encryption, which can cause runtime overhead to be too high to be practical. However, since the proposed scheme does not require encryption, it is more advantageous to combine it with other schemes as well as has higher performance.

7. Conclusions {#sec7-sensors-19-02625}
==============

This paper describes an analysis of the contents of `ART`, the new runtime system of Android. Based on this analysis, we propose a reverse engineering analysis prevention technique using the relationship between `Dalvik` bytecode and machine code. The proposed scheme protects the application from static analysis by preventing exposure of the `Dalvik` bytecode, which is easier to analyze compared with machine code, and also prevents dynamic analysis using `ART`'s execution transition structure. In addition, the proposed scheme introduces `Core OAT` and `Camo DEX` to provide versatility and practicality. `Camo DEX` can also improve the reversing resistance of the proposed scheme by acting as an additional trap along with solving the original `Core OAT` compatibility problem.

The reverse engineering resistance of the proposed scheme is demonstrated through reverse engineering analysis experiments on its application. In the reverse engineering analysis results, the original state `Dalvik` bytecode could not be obtained by either the static analysis or dynamic analysis. It was confirmed that only the trap code, which operates completely differently, was exposed.

In conclusion, the proposed anti-reversing scheme can be used as a core technology to protect newly introduced `ART`-based Android applications from reversing by intentionally exposing the trap to the application and blocking exposure of the core code. Ultimately, it is expected to contribute greatly to the security of IoT devices that are compatible with `ART`-based mobile devices.
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###### 

List of `OAT` file checksum data.

  Sectioname     Section Component Name
  -------------- --------------------------------------
  `OatHeader`    `alder32_checksum`
  `OatHeader`    image file location `oat checksum`
  `OatHeader`    image file location `oat data begin`
  `OatDexFile`   `dex` file location `checksum`
  `Dex File`     `dex` file `checksum`
  `Dex File`     `SHA1` signature

sensors-19-02625-t002_Table 2

###### 

Required reversing skills to analyze protected code.

  Target Objects   Required Skills                 `ProGuard`   `DexGuard`   Proposed Scheme
  ---------------- ------------------------------- ------------ ------------ -----------------
                   Decompile                       ✓            ✓            ✓
                   `Dalvik` bytecode               ✓            ✓            ✓
  Bytecode         API knowledge                   ✓            ✓            ✓
                   Repackaging                     ✓            ✓            ✓
                   `Dalvik VM` & `ART` framework                             ✓
  Crypto routine   Encryption algorithms                        ✓            
                   CPU instruction                                           ✓
  Machine code     Disassemble                                               ✓
                   Debugging                                                 ✓
                   `OAT(ELF)` file structure                                 ✓

sensors-19-02625-t003_Table 3

###### 

Runtime overhead.

  ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Original   `ProGuard`   `DexGuard`   Proposed Scheme
  ----------------- ---------- ------------ ------------ -----------------
  Execution time\   11.494     11.073       58.699       17.793
  (milliseconds)                                         

  ------------------------------------------------------------------------
